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PARTIAL NEGOTIABILITY OF IRREGULAR INSTRUMENTS*
The increasing number of cases involving types of paper clearly
intended as promissory notes, but irregular in some respect, dem-
onstrates the fact that the simple note form is not sufficient for business
* Irregular instrument, paper or document in this comment refers to a writing
expressed in such terms as to invite transfer and reliance by the transferee for
value and in good faith on his obtaining all rights the paper calls for, to the
exclusion of some or all hidden equities, but which does not fall within any of the
[302
COMMENTS
needs. There is so little variance in the form of some of these instru-
ments that they are often held to be within the Negotiable Instruments
Law and subject generally to its provisions.1 But there is noticeable hin
the decisions an unfortunate tendency to rule that an agreement pos-
sesses either all or none of the attributes of negotiability.2 Procedural
regulations, the attachment of standardized, complex contractual obliga-
tions to a signature on the instrument at one place or another, the possi-
bility of transfer free from equities of title and defense-all of these
and other incidents as well, are characteristics of true bills and notes.--
The most striking of these attributes, the possibility of transfer free
from equities and defenses, is sought in the more irregular types of
paper. The present discussion is directed at ascertaining, on the basis
of decided cases and of policy, how far this end can and should be
achieved.
A recent case, American National Bank v. A. G. Sommerville, Inc.
(1923, Calif.) 216 Pac. 376, dealt with the rights of a bona fide pur-
chaser of "automobile paper," one of many types of commercial instru-
ments intended to be transferred free from the defenses of the maker
and the equities of holders, but which in their wording do not fully
comply with the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The
contract was for the conditional sale of an automobile, and contained a
provision that a good faith assignee of the contract would have the
right to payment of the named installments of the purchase price free
standard classes of negotiable instruments established by decision or statute. The
particular instruments dealt with are certain types of conditional sale contracts,
scrip certificates, interim certificates and voting trust stock certificates.
'Many of these instruments would be true promissory notes, except for addi-
tional provisions added. Provisions for the acceleration of the due date: Boyd v.
Bearce (i92o) 48 Calif. App. 46, 191 Pac. 56o (on default of interest payment-
held non-negotiable) ; Commerce Trust Co. v. Guarantee Title & Trust Co. (1923,
Kan.) 214 Pac. 61o (same held negotiable); White v. Hatcher (1916) 135 Tenn.
6og, 188 S. W. 6i (on default of payment of one note in series-held negotiable) ;
Mechanics & Metals National Bank v. Warner (gIg, La.) 83 So. 228 (if value of
collateral security depreciates and additional security is not furnished-held nego-
tiable) ; (i921) 6 IowA L. Bum. 239; Chafee, Acceleration Provisions in Time
Paper (919) 32 HARV. L. R-v. 747. Provisions.reciting terms of conditional sale
agreements: Vancouver National Bank v. Starr (1923, Wash.) 211 Pac. 746
(held non-negotiable) ; Welch v. Owenby (i918, Okla.) 175 Pac. 746 (held nego-
tiable) ; Continental Guaranty Corp. v. People's Bus Line (1922, Del.) Hx7 Atl.
275 (held negotiable); NorEs (1922) i OR. L. Ray. x73. Provision authorizing
holder to extend time of payment without releasing obligation of persons sec-
ondarily liable: Quinn v. Bane (917) 182 Iowa, 843, 164 N. W. 788 (hold non-
negotiable); Bank of Whitehouse v. White (1917) 136 Tenn. 634, 191 S. W. 332
(held negotiable); First National Bank of Sidney v. Baldwin (i916) 1oo Neb.
25, 158 N. W. 371 (held negotiable); (i917) 5 VA. L. REv. 145.
'Llewellyn, Supervening Impossibility of Performing Conditions Precedent in
the Law of Negotiable Paper (1923) 23 CoL L. Rzv. 142, 143.
'For a discussion of the characteristics of negotiability, see Chafee, Rights in
Overdue Paper (x918) 3 HARv. L. REv. 1io4, iio5.
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from any defenses of the vendee. In a suit on the contract by such an
assignee total failure of consideration was held to be a possible defense.
But the court ruled that if it could be shown that the defendant had
misrepresented to the plaintiff that consideration had been received,
then the defendant would be estopped from using that defense.
It is clear that a paper, although not within the terms of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law, may be so drawn and used as to bar defenses
(or ownership claims) against a taker for value and in good faith.
It is clear, also, that the concepts of estoppel and of effective negotiation
are closely related. But to establish as a fact an affirmative act of the
maker which was intended as a false representation to a third party
unknown at the time of the act, is not an easy matter. The signing
of such a paper as that in the instant case may well constitute such an
active misrepresentation as to serve as a basis for estoppel and may be
fairly regarded as a representation to any prospective good faith pur-
chaser that consideration has been received. The court, in ruling that
no "estoppel by contract" existed, because without consideration there
was no effective contract (which means that the original intention of the
defendant had to be inquired into) seems to have fallen into the old
confusion of "contract," a consensual legal obligation, with "contract,"
a written document.4 Surely under the facts, there could be an
estoppel by the writing, regardless of whether it had as between the
original parties legally operative force. On the other hand, it seems
clear that proof of an original voluntary delivery by the maker would
be essential to such an estoppel; although, as with any document
depending on delivery, its possession by a proper party might well
raise a presumption of such a delivery.5 The argument for such effect
has additional weight where the instrument involved constitutes a well
established, even though perhaps not the only practical method of
reaching an end necessary to an important industry. It is clear that
large sums of money are now invested by banks in "automobile paper,"
and that adequate banking facilities are requisite under our present
established marketing methods. True, by the use of a simple note,
' See Corbin, Offer and Acceptance (917) 26 YAI LAW JOURNAL, i69.
'In the development of the ngotiability of bills of lading, estoppel likewise
played an important part. Here, as throughout the law with respect to bona fide
purchasers for value, the maker's (or original owner's) intention to create the
deceptive appearance expressed in a voluntary delivery of the document, seems
first to have been insisted upon; then the closeness of the causal relation to the
appearance required was decreased, as by giving negligence an equivalent effect;
lastly, the emphasis shifted almost entirely to the deceptive appearance, and only
the genuineness of the maker's or endorser's 'signature is regarded. Our law has
not completely reached this stage, even in bills and notes, since fraud with regard
to. the nature of the paper signed may still prevent effective negotiation as against
the defrauded party. The continent has gone further in permitting a purchaser in
due course to acquire good title even over a forged indorsement. Moore's discus-
sion, classic although confined to bills and notes and to the defense (as opposed to
the ownership) aspect of negotiability, is in NOTES (917) i7 COL. L. REv. 617.
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with the conditional sale contract attached as collateral, the desired
result of permitting the lender to obtain an obligation negotiable before
maturity might be attained. But is it not fair to assume that the
existing practice has reason for its existence and to give it all the
effect possible, consistently with settled rules?
In other recent cases, moreover, which present another aspect of
negotiability, to wit, the relative ownership rights of prior and subse-
quent holders, the instruments involved do constitute the only apparent
means of reaching results which are well-nigh essential. 6 The transac-
tion generally concerns an investment in some security (notably a
prospective bond issue) the evidence of which is not to be issued for
an indefinite time.7  Certificates, entitling the holder to the evidence of
'In President of Manhattan Co. v. Morgan (1922, ist Dept) i99 App. Div. 767,
192 N. Y. Supp. 239, were involved certificates entitling holders upon return of the
certificates to receive described bonds, "when, as and if" delivered to the maker
of the certificate. A provision gave the maker power to consider any bearer as
owner. It was held that an allegation that the plaintiff bearer was the lawful
owner and holder was sufficient on a motion to make more definite. The dicta are
favorable to enforcing the paper in much the way it read. In Hearne v. Gillette
(1922) 151 La. 79, 91 So. 634, so-called "negotiable trust receipts," containing
written promises that described stock would be delivered on order upon delivery
of the receipts, had been transferred to assignees. Attaching creditors of the
original owner of the instrument were held to have rights superior to those of the
transferees of the receipts. That the instrument involved was not really a trust
receipt, see Frederick, The Trust Receipt as Security (1922) 22 COL. L. REV. 395,
546. In Bowie v. National City Bank of Seattle (1922, Wash.) 210 Pac. 498,
there was an interim receipt for a subscription to United States certificates of
indebtedness to be delivered on return of the receipt properly indorsed. The receipt
seems to have been registered. The agent bank had taken the receipt in its own
name. There was an endorsement to the principal, but without delivery; a forgery
of the principal's name; and collection through the defendant bank. In an action
by the principal, apparently based on some theory of conversion of a negotiable
instrument, the judgment was for the defendant. The case shows little as to
possible negotiable attributes of the paper (if unregistered) since the theory of
the complaint is almost unintelligible, and the result would have been the same
had the paper been fully negotiable. The words "will be delivered . . .only upon
return of this certificate properly endorsed" would, of course, have made the
instrument negotiable had it been a certificate of deposit calling for repayment of
money. And the indorsements (special, blank and "Pay any bank or banker")
indicate that the banks which handled it treated it largely as if it were a negotiable
instrument. In determining in that case the rights of the unnamed party in
interest, assistance might well have been had from the decisions in analogous cases
of negotiable paper proper. See COMMPNTS (1923) YALE LAW JOURNAL, 177;
and see Fultz v. Walters (1874) 2 Mont I65.
'The sums involved are large. The borrower needs the funds speedily. The
underwriter may have liquid funds available, but desires speedy disbursement The
investors to whom he turns require an evidence of an obligation which they can sell
or use as collateral for a loan. Some interim paper of "quasi-negotiable" character
is therefore of material value to the machinery of investment banking. A promis-
sory note of the underwriter fails to meet the case, first, because of the uncertainty
of the time element, and secondly, because the transaction contemplates a loan not
to the underwriters, the intermediary, but to the ultimate borrower.
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the security, "when, as and if issued," upon presentation of the certifi-
cate, meet the requirements of the investor only if a bona fide pur-
chaser or lender can safely accept the instrument. Scrip certificates of
this character for the prospective bonds of a foreign government," and
for the stock of a private banking company,9 have been held by English
courts to be transferable free from the equities of title, by one to whom
they had been entrusted. The practice among bankers and merchants
of treating similar documents as transferring title by delivery was the
principal basis for the decisions. The leading English case, Goodwin
v. Robarts,'0 has been cited with approval in New York"1 in a case deal-
ing with the rights of a transferee of a voting trust stock certificate,
which entitled a named person to receive certificates of stock on a day
certain.' 2 The instrument was said to be "negotiable" like the stock
it represented; and the pledgee, though the pledgor had exceeded his
authority, had rights superior to those of the original owner. It has
been suggested that the principles of estoppel by ostensible agency
apply to cut off the rights of prior holders of instruments of this char-
acter.13 But it is clear that to w6rk such an estoppel there is required,
here also, a voluntary delivery or entrusting of the paper by the party
estopped to the party who transfers it wrongfully, a fact unnecessary
I In Goodwin v. Robarts (1876, H. L.) L. R. i A. C. 476, a bona fide pledgee
from an agent entrusted with possession of a scrip certificate for foreign bonds
was held not liable to the principal and original owner either in trovei- or assumpsit,
although the pledge was a fraud on the latter's rights. No emphasis was placed
on any clauses in the scrip, but only on commercial and banking usage.
'In Rumball v. Metropolitan Bank (1877) L. R. 2 Q. B. Div. 194, scrip certifi-
cates for private banking stock were held negotiable and a bona fide pledgee from
a broker entrusted with possession, had rights superior to those of the holder who
had deposited them with the fraudulent broker. It will be observed that these
cases go no further than the rule of possession plus indicia of ownership, derived
from the party estopped,-that is no further than the cases at common law on
stock certificates and bills of lading, and sec. 4o of the Warehouse Receipts Act
"Supra note 8.
" Union Trust Co. v. Oliver (1915) 214 N. Y. 5r7, 525, lo8 N. E. 8og, 812.
' By use of the voting trust certificate, stockholders are enabled to unify the
control of a corporation in designated trustees for a definite time, usually in an
effort to weather an emergency. Generally, all the stock of the corporation is
turned over to the named person or group and voting trust stock certificates are
issued in its place, entitling the holders to the return of certificates of stock after
a set date upon presentation of the voting trust stock certificate. Similar arrange-
ments may be made to secure the deposit of bonds with a committee, looking tojoint protective action. It is obvious that at times such unified control may be
essential to effective operation and consistent business and financial policy; and
further, that to induce stock or bond holders to co~perate without leaving them an
equally transferable security is a useless hardship, even where it can be accom-
plished.
' Ewart, Estoppel (I9OO) 434. It seems upon closer analysis more accurate
to apply the explanation of estoppel by ostensible ownership as developed by the
same writer inasmuch as the agent pledges the instrument in derogation of the
owner's right for his own debt.
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to true and full negotiability.14 It is further to be noted that in the
English cases the rulings were reached wholly on the effect of the
appearance of the document, as evidenced by usage. There were no
clauses expressly providing for an estoppel.
The recent American cases suggest inquiry into how far the lan-
guage of the document can be made to have still further effect along
this line. In the instruments involved in President of Manhattan Co.
v. Morgan,5 there was an express stipulation that the maker was to
have power to consider any bearer as owner. Such a provision should
be enforceable. There is an analogous situation where savings banks
by express provisions in pass-books escape liability for all but negli-
gent payments to others than the rightful owners of deposits, if the
pass-book is presented. 6 But the savings bank analogy, and the lan-
guage of the clause, leave open one by no means unimportant problem
Suppose before the bearer (being, let us assume, the bona fide
purchaser from a thief or fraudulent agent) presents the paper, that a
creditor of the original holder attaches or garnishees the maker,, or
suppose that the maker is given notice in good season of the theft or
defalcation. Can the maker still treat the bearer as the owner? And
if so, and the bearer has the avails in hand, can he keep them as against
the defrauded owner or the owner's creditor? These two questions
need not necessarily be answered the same way. The clause is obviously
inserted for the maker's benefit. But it is believed that any court
which would-and perhaps soundly-answer the latter question in the
negative would likewise construct a condition to the maker's privilege,
that he be not on notice of any improper transfer, or, as the case may
be, of any accrued lien-interest of attaching creditors.'7 But suppose
an additional stipulation to be incorporated, by which all takers are to
waive their equities as against subsequent bona fide holders. Should
this in any event, obtain its expressed result? Any owner by the mere
taking of a contract expressed to give only such rights might well be
held to its terms. Likewise any purchaser might properly be permitted
-as against claimants prior in time-to rely on receiving the full
rights indicated by the paper. Nor is there cause for giving creditors
in such a case rights exceeding those of the debtor under whom they
" See Uniform Bills of Lading Act, sec. 38; Uniform Stock Transfer Act, sec.
6. See also note 5 supra; and cf. note 9 supra.
' Supra note 6.
"Bulakowski v. Philadelphia Savings Fund Soc. (1921) 27o Pa. 538, 113 Atl.
553; Ninoff v. Hazel Green State Bank (I92i) 174 Wis. 56o, 183 N. W. 673;
Langdale v. Citizens' Bank of Savannah (i9o4) I2 Ga. 1o5, 48 S. E. 708.
' In Hearne v. Gillette, supra note 6, rights of attaching creditors of the original
holder of the stock were held superior to the claim of the transferees of the "trust
receipt" That instrument contained no stipulation empowering the maker to
treat an apparently regular transferee as owner. But from the reasoning of that
case it seems highly improbable that the presence of such a stipulation would have
led to any different result in that court.
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claim. It will be observed that such a doctrine goes beyond true
estoppel, since it would not,. and should not, require for its operation
a voluntary delivery or entrusting by the prior owner sought to be
estopped. 18
Wherever commercial practice has resulted in the treatment of certain
instruments as having in substance certain attributes of negotiability,
and where those instruments constitute a practical method of meeting a
specific problem, the English view has much to commend it. Careful
drafting of such instruments to include provisions whereby the maker
waives all defenses and receives the power-even the duty-to recog-
nize the bearer as owner, and whereby each taker waives his equities
of title, should assure to all bona fide holders, at least after the first
delivery, that freedom from the equities of the maker and of prior
holders which business needs and factual expectations require.
Although the decided cases on the subject are few in number, the
extent to which instruments of these general types are in common
circulation indicates their commercial importance.
PROCEDURE AND SUBSTANCE IN STATE COURTS ENFORCING FEDERAL
STATUTORY RIGHTS
The invocation of a state court to enforce a right created' or limited 2
by Congress involves difficulties in determining what matters are to be
regulated by federal procedure and what by state procedure.3  In suits
A similar result would be obtained by applying to the situation in In re Euro-
pean Bank (1870) L. R. 5 Ch. App. 358, the doctrine contended for by Chafee,
op. cit. supra note 3, at p. ino8, that equities of title but not equities of defense
are cut off by transfer after maturity. For in the English case there was no
possible question of true estoppel, but only of a deceptive appearance; the paper
there involved being overdue, though originally negotiable, would be much less
current in business practice than such an instrument as is here under consideration.
1 See for example the Second Employers' Liability Act which gives the injured
employee an action against the carrier enforceable either in the state or federal
courts. Act of April 22, igo8 (35 Stat. at L. 65, 66), as amended by Act of
April 5, igio (36 Stat. at. L. 291), and which was held constitutional in Mondou
v. N. Y. N. H. & H. Ry. (1912) 223 U. S. I, 32 Sup. Ct. i69. The state courts
have jurisdiction to enforce rights created by this statute. St. Louis Ry. v.
Conley (I911, C. C. A. 8th) 187 Fed. 949; cf. Midland Valley R. R. v. Le Moyne
(1912) 104 Ark. 327, 148 S. W. 654.
2 Congressional limitations upon the extent of the carrier's duty to transport
baggage safely was effected by the Carmack Amendment, Act of June 29, 19o6
(34 Stat. at L. 584, 595) which permitted the carrier to limit the amount recover-
able to an agreed valuation, even where the suit is brought in a state court.
Adams Express Co. v. Croninger (1913) 226 U. S. 491, 33 Sup. Ct. 148; and see
American Ry. Express Co. v. Lindenburg (1923, U. S.) 43 Sup. Ct. 2o6; (1923)
32 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 500.
'If the suit were in the federal court to enforce a claim given by a state
statute, the federal court, under the Conformity Act, would follow the procedure
of the state in which the trial was being held. Act of June I, 1872 (7 Stat.
at L. ig6, 197) sec. 5; see NOTES (1915) 29 HAxv. L. REv. 95.
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in state courts under the Second Employers' Liability Act it has been
held that questions affecting the amendment of pleadings after the
statute of limitations had run,4 the number of jurors required to concur
in a verdict," the degree of conviction necessary in a juror's mind to
warrant a verdict,6 the necessity for special verdicts,7 the use of special
interrogatories to test a verdict," the use of conclusions of law in plead-
ings,9 and the time when an action is deemed commenced so as to stop
the running of the statute of limitations,' ° are determined by the state
practice. On the other hand, problems as to who shall bear the burden
of proof of the defendant's original negligence,:1 of contributory negli-
gence,12 and of assumption of risk' 3 are determined by the federal rules
of procedure.'4 In the recent case of American Railway Express Co.
'Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Renn (1915) 17o N. C. 128, 86 S. E. 964; affirmed
241 U. S. 29o, 36 Sup. Ct. 567.
'Minneapolis & St. L. R. R. v. Bombolis (9,5) 241 U. S. 211, 36 Sup. Ct. 595
(five-sixths of jurors authorized to return a verdict after twelve hours delibera-
tion) ; Louisville & N. R. R. v. Holloway's Adm'r. (1916) 168 Ky. 262, 181
S. W. 1126 (verdict by three-fourths of jurors not a violation of seventh
amendment).
'The state court does not have to adopt the federal rule that "the jury must
believe from the evidence that the plaintiff's evidence is true" but may use its
own rule that if the jury believe the plaintiff's theory it is enough. Louisville
& N. R. R. v. Johnson's Adm'r. (1914) 161 Ky. 824, 171 S. W. 847. At best the
distinction seems metaphysical, practically it is of little value. See 5 Wigmore,
Evidence (2d ed. 1923) secs. 2497, 2498.
T Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Meadows (1916) 119 Va. 33, 89 S. E. 244.
"Jones v. Erie Ry. (1923, Ohio) 14o N. E. 366.
'Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Wheeler (1920) 75 Ind. App. 191, 129 N. E. 40.
" Murker v. Northern Pac. Ry. (1917) 95 Wash. 280, 163 Pac. 756. Similarly
the competency of admissions made by the deceased is regulated by state practice.
Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Leslie (1914) 112 Ark. 305, 167 S. W. 83. And the
amount of proof necessary to establish proximate cause. Gregory's Adm'r. v.
Director-General (1922, Ky.) 242 S. W. 373. And the effect of the defendant's
failure to plead the statute of limitations. Pittsburgh Ry. v. Ireton (192o) 73
Ind. App. 449, 126 N. E. 43r.
'The earlier decisions permitted state procedure to govern; and the local
prima facie statutes which, in effect, relieved the plaintiff of the burden of prov-
ing defendant's original negligence were applied. New Orleans Ry. v. Scarlet
(1917) 115 Miss. 285, 76 So. 265. But since under the Employers' Liability
Act the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff must affirmatively establish negli-
gence, the prima facie statutes are now inapplicable. New Orleans & N. E.
Ry. v. Harris (ii8) 247 U. S. 367, 38 Sup. Ct. 535; Yazoo & M. V. Ry. v.
McCaskell (1918) 118 Miss. 629, 79 So. 817; New Orleans Ry. v. Scarlet (1919)
i2o Miss. 665, 83 So. i; Kent v. Erie Ry. (192o) 228 N. Y. 94, 126 N. E. 646;
cf. Manning v. Chicago Great Western Ry. (1916) 135 Minn. 229, i6o N. W. 787
(burden of proof of negligence held substantive).
1 Central Vermont Ry. v. White (1915) 238 U. S. 507, 35 Sup. Ct. 865;
Holmberg v. Lake Shore Ry. (1915) 188 Mich. 6o5, 155 N. W. 504.
" Crugley v. Grand Trunk Ry. (1919) 79 N. H. 276, loB AtI. 293; cf. Seaboard
Air Line Ry. v. Moore (1913) 228 U. S. 433, 33 Sup. Ct. 580.
" So the measure of damages is determined by the provisions of the act and
the general common law as administered by the federal courts unaffected by
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v. Levee (1923, U. S.) 44 Sup. Ct. II, a Louisiana statute making loss
of baggage prima facie proof of conversion was held inapplicable in
a suit in the state court, since the shipper had signed a receipt approved
by the Interstate Commerce Commission limiting the carrier's liability
for loss.
The result of these cases is usually expressed in terms of "substance"
and "procedure." But what is "substance" and what is "procedure" ?15
Salmond has shown that the classical distinction between jus and
remedium is inaccurate, 16 for many rights belong to the sphere of
procedure, and a rule defining the remedy may be as much a part of
the substantive law as one defining the right itself.1 7  "Substance,"
however, denotes the rules that determine the legal relations when all of
the facts have been made known to the court; "procedure' concerns
the process by which the facts are made known. Moreover, the results
of these cases are described in terms of a formula: the law of the
state-leax fori-governs matters of procedure, while the federal law-
leax loci delicti-governs substantive rights."' Starting with such a'
state legislations. Laughlin v. Kansas City Southern Ry. (igi8) 275 Mo. 459,
205 S. W. 3. But that the jury may follow the state rule in assessing damages
so as to include probable gifts see a dictum in Sweet v. Chicago & N. W. Ry.
(1914) 157 Wis. 400, 147 N. W. 1054. A protracted conflict has been waged
as to whether state or federal practice in directing verdicts should govern. The
federal courts follow the rule that a verdict will be directed where the court
must set aside a contrary verdict as against the evidence. North Penn. Ry. v.
Bank (1887) 123 U. S. 727, 8 Sup. Ct. 266; Mount Adams Ry. v. Lowery (i806,
C. C. A. 6th) 74 Fed. 463; Dernberger v. B. & 0. Ry (i9i6, N. D. W. Va.) 234
Fed. 405. Some state courts adhering to the so-called "scintilla" rule have held
that directing a verdict is a matter of procedure and hence followed their
"scintilla" rule. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Johnson's Adm'r., supra note 6;
Dutton. v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. (1916) 1O4 S. C. 16, 88 S. .E. 263 (saying
that there is little difference between the two rules) ; Louisville & N. R. R. v.
Holloway's Adm'r. (19,5) 163 Ky. 125, 173 S. W. 343; Mulligan v. Atlantic
Coast Line Ry. (igi6) 104 S. C. 173, 88 S. E. 445. But since the decision in
New Orleans Ry. v. Harris, supra note 1i, the matter of directing a verdict
has been held to be substantive and so governed by the federal rule. Illinois
Cent. Ry. v. Johnston (i92o) 205 Ala. 1, 87 So. 866.
15 It must be apparent that in a philosophical sense every fact which is neces-
sary to secure a verdict is a matter of substance. What the parties said and
did, the decisions of courts as to the result attaching to certain phenomena, the
number of jurors who must concur in a verdict are operative facts. All must be
present before a judgment can be had; and hence, in this sense, are matters
of substance.
"'Salmond, Jurisprudence (6th ed. 1920) 437, 438; see COMMENTS (1923)
33 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 193.
' Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and the Conflicts of Laws (1923) 32 YALE
LAw JOURNAL, 311, 324.
". ... matters of pleading and practice are governed by the local laws."
Holloway, J., in Ecclesine v. Great Northern Ry. (192o) 58 Mont. 470, 474, 194
Pac. 143, 144. "Where an act of Congress commits to the state court the duty
of trying cases arising thereunder such cases may be tried according to the
state rules of procedure." Timlin, J., in Sweet v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., supra
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premise the courts have called those matters which they desired to be
regulated by the federal law substantive,' reserving the term procedural
for those which they were content to have regulated by state practice'
20
A striking example of the inconsistencies encountered when courts
attempt to harmonize socially desirable results with that rule is found in
the decisions regarding the nature of burden of proof in personal
injury suits brought under the Employers' Liability Act. At common
law in every state and federal jurisdiction if the plaintiff can show (i)
that he was injured, (2) that the defendant was negligent, (3) that the
defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury, and (4)
that he observed due care, he will get a verdict. And if the defendant
can alter the facts in the fourth category to show that the plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence, the defendant will get a verdict.2 '
This element alternatively designated as "due care" or "contributory
negligence" cannot be ignored.22  Some state of facts does exist; and
if the parties fail to give proof of the actual state of facts, a hypothetical
state must be assumed. 23  That is the whole significance of burden of
note 14, at p. 411, i47 N. W. at p. io58. Cf. "As long as a question involves mere
matters of procedure as to the time when and the order in which evidence
should be submitted the state court can, in those and similar instances, follow
their own practice even in the trial of suits arising under the Federal law."
Lamar, J., in Central Vermont Ry. v. White, supra note 12, at p. 511, 35 Sup.
Ct. at p. 867.
% , ... the question of burden of proof is a matter of substance and not
subject to control by the law of the several states." McReynolds, J., in New
Orleans & N. E. Ry. v. Harris, supra note Ii, at p. 372, 38 Sup. Ct. at p. 536.
" The accuracy of every definition is to be tested only by the purpose for
which it is made. Any classification which is helpful in solving a particular
purpose is, to that extent, correct; difficulty is encountered only when we
characterize a definition made for a particular purpose as true in some universal
sense and insist that the same meaning be used for all other purposes.
'Under the Employers' Liability Act contributory negligence does not bar the
plaintiff's claim to damages, but only diminishes the damages in proportion to
the amount of his negligence. Act of April 22, igo8 (35 Stat at L. 66) sec. 3;
Portland Terminal Co. v. Jarvis (1915, C. C. A. 1st) 227' Fed. 8; Saunders v.
Southern Ry. (194) 167 N. C. 375, 83 S. E. 573. So no degree of negligence
on the part of an employee injured by the carrier's negligence, however gross,
can bar a recovery. Pennsylvania Co. v. Cole (1914, C. C. A. 6th) 214 Fed. 948.
But there can be no recovery if the employee's death was caused solely by his
own negligence. Ellis's Adm'r. v. Louisville Ry. (1913) 155 Ky. 745, i6o S. W.
512. It may be that this difference in the effect of contributory negligence has
influenced the determination of the incidence of the burden of proof.
"Even a requirement that certain facts be absent is in reklity a requirement
that certain other facts be present plus a prediction that the addition of the
fact required to be present would change the result.
"The term assumption is not used as synonymous with presumption. A
rebuttable presumption has various possible effects. It may be a justifiable
inference; it may be a compelled inference; or it may actually shift the ultimate
burden of proof. In the last two cases it means that the effect given to a
particular fact is greater than the probative value of that fact would warrant
The reason for giving such effect is found in the court's experience as to the
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proof in the sense of the risk of non-persuasion. It means that a
certain assumption is made concerning the state of the facts in a
necessary element of the cause of action; and the burden of showing
facts in contradiction to the assumption is placed on the party who by
reason of ability and fairness should bear it.24  The federal courts have
uniformly held that due care would be assumed, thus placing the burden
of proving plaintiff's lack of care upon the defendant. 25  Some state
courts seem to hold that due care on the plaintiff's part will not be
assumed, thus throwing that burden of proof upon the plaintiff.26 But
in both jurisdictions with the same facts actually established, the result
is the same.2 7  The incidence of burden of proof is, then, a rule of
procedure indicating the party who must make particular facts appear
before the tribunal and not a matter of substance, in the sense of rules
defining legal relations when all the facts are known.
A similar controversy has arisen in the determination of whether the
plaintiff must bear the burden of establishing the defendant's original
negligence. By statute in some states the fact of an accident upon a
railroad is prima facie proof of the carrier's negligence. 28  That has,
normal conduct of men, in its desire to obviate difficulties of proof, and in its
wish to adjust the rights of the litigants as though the fact presumed did exist.
Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law upon the Burde. of
Proof (1920) 68 U. PA. L. REv. 307. An assumption, however, denbtes what
facts the court considers as already existing when it begins the trial of the
case, or when the assumption is made.
"'The aftempt to devise a priori formulae to determine the party to bear the
burden of proof has proved abortive. It is said that it is on the person having
in form the affirmative allegation. i Greenleaf, Evidence (4th ed. 1848) sec. 74.
Or on the person having peculiar means of knowledge. Kettles v. People (io6)
221 Ill. 221, 77 N. E. 472; King v. Turner (186, K. B.) 5 Maule & S. 2o6.
While ihese are useful working tools, ultimately the apportionment rests upon
broad considerations of policy and fairness. 5 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 6,
sec. 2488.
'Railroad Co. v. Gladinon (1872, U. S.) i5 Wall. 401; Hough v. Railw&y Co.
(1879) 100 U. S. 213; Inland Coasting Co. v. Tolson (i8gi) 139 U. S. 55I;
Washington & G. Ry. v. Harmon's Adin'r. (1893) 147 U. S. 571. This rule
prevails in the federal courts irrespective of the decisions of the courts of the
state in which the federal court is held. Hemingway v. Illinois Cent. Ry. (1902,
C. C. A. 5th) 114 Fed. 843; cf. Central Vermont Ry. v. White, supra note 12.
"Decatur v. Simpson (19o2) 115 Iowa, 348, 88 N. W. 839; Haner v. Northern
Pac. Ry. (19oo) 7 Idaho, 305, 62 Pac. lO28; Brown v. Illinois Cent. Ry. (19o4)
123 Iowa, 239, 98 N. W. 625; Guthrie v. Nix (I895) 3 Okla. 136, 41 Pac. 343;
see Di Marcho v. Builders' Foundry (1892) 18 R. I. 514, 27 Atl. 328; cf. Chicago
St. R. R. v. Louis (189i) 138 Ill. 9, 27 N. E. 451 (burden on plaintiff) with
Consolidated Coal Co. v. Wombacher (189o) 134 Ill. 57, 24 N. E. 627 (burden
on defendant). In a few states the burden is cast upon the plaintiff to prove
due care where his pleadings or his evidence show that prima facie as a matter
of law he has been guilty of negligence. Gulf Ry. v. Shieder (1895) 88 Tex.
152, 30 S. W. 902; Tannehill v. Kansas City Ry. (1919) 279 Mo. 158, 213
S. W. 818.
See NoTEs (1915) 29 H~Av. L. Rxv. 95.
"Miss. Code, 1916, sec. 1645; N. Y. Laws, 19IO, ch. 481, sec. 64.
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in some states, been interpreted to mean that the court begins with the
assumption of negligence on the defendant's part as soon as the fact of
the accident is established, instead of starting with the contrary normal
assumption of no negligence. But if negligence is in fact established,
or if "no negligence" in fact is established, the result is the same as in
jurisdictions starting with the opposite assumption.29  Under the
Employers' Liability Act such statutes do not apply.30 And in the
instant case the Louisiana prima facie statute was held inapplicable
because Congress had limited the extent of the carrier's liability. These
holdings mean that the state court must revert to the common law
assumption of no negligence. But the effect of negligence or of no
negligence has not been changed. Given the actual state of facts, the
substantive rights of the parties are unaltered.
If these results are correct, that the federal law-lex loci delicti-does
govern procedural matters, either the premise that the lex fori alone
governs matters of procedure is inaccurate, or substance must be
defined in some new way to include these cases. Some courts have
done this.31 On the other hand, the Supreme Court while recently
recognizing that some of these controversial matters are procedural,
nevertheless holds that a state court in enforcing a federal statutory
right must employ the federal, not the state, rule of procedure.82
Undoubtedly Congress has the power in the interest of the uniform
= There is, of course, a certain procedural advantage purposely bestowed by
the legislature. There is a tactical hardship cast upon the defendant; and the
penalty put upon the failure to bear the burden of proof is the loss of the case.
But despite this procedural disadvantage the rules governing the relations of
the parties when all of the facts are known are unchanged, and no obstacle is
placed in the way of making them known. See 5 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note
6, sec. 2485, 2487. The importance, however, of this procedural advantage seems
sufficient to justify the result of the cases insisting that the federal rule be used.
'New Orleans & N. E. Ry. v. Harris, supra note II; Kent v. Erie Ry., supra
note iI.
". ... the matter of burden of proof is regarded as of the substance of the
right created by the federal act and is, hence, without the category of 'practice
and procedure.'" McClellan, J., in Illinois Cent. Ry. v. Johnston (192o) 205
Ala. I, 6, 87 So. 866, 870. "Assumption of risk is a substantive issue. It is
not a mere matter of procedure nor a rule of evidence." Dausman, J., in
Pennsylvania Co. v. Stalker (1918) 67 Ind. App. 329, 337, 119 N. E. 163, 165.
The cases, of course, only state a result, not the reasons for that result.
"'The state court may deal with that [effect of appearance] as they think
proper in local matters but they cannot treat it as defeating a plain assertion
of federal right . . . . If the Constitution and the laws of the United States
are to be enforced, this court cannot accept as final the decision of the state
tribunal as to what are the facts alleged to give rise to the right or to bar the
assertion of it even upon local grounds. This is familiar as to the substantive
law and for the same reasons it is necessary to see that local practice shall not
be allowed to put unreasonable obstacles in the way." Holmes, J., in Davis v.
Wechsler (1923, U. S.) 44 Sup. Ct. 13, 14. "The law of the United States
cannot be evaded by the forms of local practice." Holmes, 3., in America;n
Railway Express Co. v. Levee (1923, U. S.) 44 Sup. Ct. II, 13.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
enforcement of the rights which it has conferred to require that the
federal practice as to the incidence of burden of proof be used. While
it is said that a litigant must use the machine of the local court as he
finds it without insisting that it function like the machine of a distant
jurisdiction, there is no reason why a procedural practice of the federal
court should not be recognized by a state court when it is of a nature to
be used conveniently and "without ethical shock to the legal machinery
of the forum."33 The law of the incidence of burden of proof in the
federal .courts is quite as easily determined by the state courts as any
other fact concerning the foreign law.
A somewhat analogous problem has arisen in the conflict of laws
between co-ordinate jurisdictions, especially in connection with the
statute of frauds. Some American jurisdictions have followed the
English case of Leroux v. Brown,3 4 holding that the fourth section
of the statute concerned a matter of procedure so as to prevent the
enforcement in England of a parol contract valid where made.3 ? The
sounder view, however, recognizes that the statute does affect legal
relations, and is, therefore, a matter of substance.36 If an oral agree-
ment is enforceable in the courts of the state in which it is made, there
exists by the laws of that state a right-duty relationship. Failure on
the part of the court of the forum to "recognize and enforce" that rela-
tionship is really a failure to create a like right-duty relationship. On
the other hand, if the oral agreement is not enforceable in the courts
of the state in which it is made, the person who has not signed a memo-
randum has a legal privilege under the law of that state not to perform
what he orally agreed to do. The other party has no right to perform-
ance; at most he has a beneficial liability that the privileged person
will, by signing a memorandum, exercise his power to create against
himself a duty to perform.3 7 For the state of the forum to attach a
right-duty relationship to those same operative facts would be for the
lex fori to create a substantive legal relationship between the parties
different from that which the lex loci would enforce.3 8
"Even the 'burden of proof' as distinguished from the 'burden of going for-
ward' may have to be controlled by the law governing the substantive rights of
the parties." Lorenzen, op. cit. supra note 17, at p. 332, note 74-
(1852) 12 C. B. 8oi.
'Bird v. Munroe (1877) 66 Me. 337; Buhl v. Stephens (1898, C. C. D. Ind.)
84 Fed. 922; Marvel v. Marvel (0903) 70 Neb. 498, 97 N. W. 64o; cf. Town-
send v. Hargraves (1875) 118 Mass. 325; see I Williston, Contracts (i92o)
sec. 527.
'Henning v. Hill (1923, Ind. App.) 141 N. E. 66; Daniels v. Rogers (19o5,
Ist Dept) lo8 App. Div. 338, 96 N. Y. Supp. 642; Miller v. Wilson (1893) 146
Ill. 523, 34 N. E. IIII.
' See Corbin, Cases on, Contracts (ig2i) 1475, note i.
'Within the field of conflict of laws between co-ordinate courts there are
few decisions concerning what law shall govern the burden of proof;, and they
seem to hold that it is a matter of procedure to be regulated by the law of the
forum. Helton v. Alabama Midland R. R. (1893) 97 Ala. 275 (Georgia prima
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In the holding that the statute of frauds concerns procedure, and
that burden of proof concerns substance, we have two divergent rules
of policy. No attempt has been made to discredit the formula that the
lex fori governs procedure and the lex loci delicti governs substance.
Nevertheless the courts in their desire to attain certain ends have classi-
fied operative facts as substantive or procedural, not upon any basis of
logical distinction but upon the basis of the definition necessary to
insure the desired result under the formula. Some state courts, eager
to extend their" jurisdiction, have thus held the statute of frauds pro-
cedural and brought it within their domain. On the other hand the
Supreme Court, desirous of a uniform administration of the laws of
Congress,39 has called burden of proof substantive and brought it under
its control. There is no inherent necessity for applying the rule that
the lex loci delicti governs only matters of substance, and it leads to
clarity of thought and simplification of the law to recognize that these
matters of burden of proof are procedural, but that when the state
court seeks to enforce a claim arising under a federal statute it must
follow federal procedure.
ACTIONS FOR PERSONAL TORT BY WIFE AGAINST HUSBAND AND CHILD
AGAINST PARENT
That the function of law is to keep pace with advancing needs of
society is evidenced by the remarkable development which has taken
place in our law within the last century. Two interesting steps in this
process of evolution have recently been contributed by the Supreme
Court of North Carolina in the cases of Roberts v. Roberts, and Snall
v. Morrison.2 In the former case a wife was allowed to sue her
husband for injuries caused by his negligence,8 while in the latter case
facie statute inadmissible); Richmond & Danville R. R. v. Mitchell (1893) 92
Ga. 77, ig S. E. 290; cf. Sackheim v. Pigueron (1915) 2,5 N. Y. 62, io9 N. E.
iog (change in rule of burden of proof held procedural and applicable to causes
of action occurring before the statute). Certainly these decisions are not neces-
sarily in conflict with the rule as developed in New Orleans & N. E. Ry. v.
Harris, supra note ii, for that decision applies only when a state court is
enforcing a right under a federal statute. The Supreme Court has never held,
as a general proposition, that the incidence of the burden of proof is a matter
of substance.
"This public policy [of Iowa] compels the citizen to give up a right granted
by federal law. It is difficult to take seriously in this day of our national history
the proposition that a state can be permitted so to destroy the power of a federal
court to carry on the work given to it under the acts of Congress." Kenyon,
J., in Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Schendel (1923, C. C. A. 8th) 292 Fed. 326, 329.
1 (1923, N. C.) 118 S. E. 9.
(1923, N. C.) 118 S. E. 12.
"The action was brought under a statute which provides, "The earnings of a
married woman by virtue of any contract for her personal services, and any
damages for personal injuries or other torts sustained by her, can be recovered
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the court, one judge dissenting, denied a child a similar right of action
against its parent.4 While apparently inconsistent in spirit, these deci-
sions may be explained by the difference in the stages of evolution
which they represent.
At common law, the wife's legal personality merged upon marriage
with that of her husband, and no suit of any kind between husband
and wife was tolerated.- The wife was practically the husband's
chattel. With the coming of the industrial revolution, however, and
the gradual entrance of woman into the fields of business, this position
of the wife necessarily became a center of agitation. The result was
the passage of the Married Women's Acts, which undertook to remove
these various disabilities, and give to the married woman the same
standing at law as she was winning for herself in society at large. But
the interpretation of the statutes has varied as widely as their actual
wording.6 Most of them expressly provide that the wife may hold
property, contract, sue and be sued apart from her husband. During
the first years following their enactment, they were considered in
derogation of the common law and hence to be strictly construed. An
action by a wife against her husband for a personal tort was everywhere
denied as not within the purview of the statute.7  Better to let the wife
suffer in silence than to drag into the courts the details of stormy matri-
monial ventures." Full and adequate remedies are open to her through
by her suing alone, and such earnings or recovery shall be her sole and separate
property as fully as if she had remained 'unmarried."' N. C. Gen. Sts. 1913,
ch. 13, sec. I.
'The plaintiff was injured in an accident caused by the negligence of her
father, who held an indemnity policy with defendant company. The policy
provided that the company should not be liable unless and until judgment had
been obtained against the insured. The plaintiff sued the indemnity company
and her father to recover damages. The company demurred on the ground,
among others, that the plaintiff had ho right of action against her -father for a
personal tort. The demurrer was sustained.
'Phillips v. Barnet (1876) L. R. i Q. B. 436; Abbott v. Abbott (1877) 67
Me. 304.
'For a classification of these divergent interpretations, see (1916) 16 Co'. L.
REv. 6o6; Schouler, Domestic Relations (6th ed. 1921) sec. 633.
'Peters v. Peters (1875) 42 Iowa, 182; Freethey v. Freethey (1865, N. Y.
Sup. Ct) 42 Barb. 641; Schultz v. Schultz (1882) 89 N. Y. 644; Libby v. Berry
(1883) 74 Me. 286; Banfield v. Banfield (1898) 117 Mich. 80, 75 N. W. 287;
Schouler, op. cit. supra note 6, sec. 633.
"The effect of giving so broad a construction to the Act of i86o might be to
involve the husband and wife in perpetual controversy and litigation-to sow
the seeds of perpetual discord and broil-to produce the most discordant and
conflicting interest of property between them, and to offer a bounty or tempta-
tion to the wife to seek encroachment upon her husband's property, which would
not only be at war with domestic peace, but deprive her probably of those
testamentary dispositions by the husband in her favor which he would otherwise
be likely to make." Longendyke v. Longendyke (1863, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 44 Barb.
366, 369.
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a criminal prosecution of the husband, or a suit for divorce, or a suit
for alimony and separate maintenance-so reasoned the courts.
It was not without a struggle that the judicial consciousness was to
rid itself of the old common law notion as to the status of the wife;
nor is that struggle yet overY The first intimation that the tide was
starting to turn came in 1910 in the dissenting opinions of Justices
Harlan, Hughes, and Holmes in the case of Thompson v. Thompson30
Four years later Connecticut blazed the trail by holding flatly that the
wife could sue the husband for a wilful tort."1 Since then at least six
states have sustained such an action,12 thus showing the gradual growth
of the conviction as to its social necessity.' 3 That this conviction is
sound is shown by the wide commendation which these decisions have
9 While the decided modern tendency is to sustain an action by the wife, the
numerical weight of authority is against it, and many courts still cling to the
stricter interpretation. Strom v. Strom (19o6) 98 Minn. 427, io7 N. W. lO47;
Keister's Adm'r v. Keister's Ex'rs (igi8) 123 Va. 157, 96 S. E. 315; Schultz v.
Christopher (I911) 65 Wash. 496, 118 Pac. 629; Rogers v. Rogers (1915) 265
Mo. 2oo, 177 S. W. 382; Dishon's Adm'r v. Dishon's Adm'r (i92o) 187 Ky. 497,
219 S. W. 794; Peters v. Peters (igog) 156 Calif. 32, 1O3 Pac. 219. The New
York courts have consistently denied the action. Perlman v. Brooklyn City Ry.
(1921, Spec. T.) 117 Misc. 353, 19I N. Y. Supp. 891; Newton v. Weber
(1922, Spec. T.) 119 Misc. 240, 196 N. Y. Supp. 113. See (1922) 32 YALE,
LAw JOURNYA, I96.
"0 ,.... Congress, under the construction placed by the court on the statute
is put in the anomalous position of allowing a married woman to sue her husband
separately in tort, for the recovery of her property, but denying her the right or
privilege to sue him separately, in tort, for damages arising from his brutal
assaults on her person." Harlan, J., dissenting, in Thompson v. Thompson
(IgIO) 218 U. S. 611, 623, 31 Sup. Ct III, 114.
"So long as there remains to the parties domestic tranquillity, while a
remnant is left of that affection and respect without which there cannot have.
been a true marriage, such action. would be impossible. When the purposes of
the marriage relation have wholly failed by reason of the misconduct of one
or both of the parties, there is no reason why the husband or wife should not
have the same remedies for injuries inflicted on the other spouse which courts
would give them against other persons. . . . No greater public convenience
and scandal can thus arise than would arise if they were left to answer one
assault with another, and one slander with another slander, until the public peace
is broken, and the criminal law invoked against them." Brown v. Brown (1914)
88 Conn. 42, 48, 89 Atl. 889, 891.
"Fiedler v. Fiedler (1914) 42 Okla. 124, 14o Pac. io22; Gilman v. Gilman
(1915) 78 N. H. 4, 95 At. 657; Fitzpatrick v. Owens (igi6) 124 Ark. 167, 186
S. W. 832; Johnson v. Johnson (1917) 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335; Prosser v.
Prosser (i92o) 114 S. C. 45, 102 S. E. 787; Crowell v. Crowell (1920) i8o
N. C. 5z6, io5 S. E. 2o6.
""Whether a man has laid open his wife's head with a bludgeon, put out her
eye, broken her arm, or poisoned her body, he is no longer exempt from liability
to her on the ground that he vowed at the altar to 'love, cherish, and protect' her.
We have progressed that far in civilization and justice. Never again will the
sun go back ten degrees on the dial of Ahaz. Isaiah 38.8." Crowell v. Crowell,
supra note 12, at p. 524, 105 S. E. at p. 21o.
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received.14 The argument from public policy against airing family
troubles to the public has never been accepted against a criminal prose-
cution of the husband,15 or against actions for divorce and alimony
6
Nor do such remedies, while they may prevent future wrongs, com-
pensate for past injuries. "If the wife may sue for a broken promise,
why may she not for a broken arm?"':1 She should have the same
relief, which she has against a stranger, also against her husband, when
he has become a stranger..' s Such a rule would not affect the happy
marriage, as love and common interest will render unnecessary any
action at law. It is only where the purposes of the marriage have utterly
failed that the wife needs this relief. But while the right is being grad-
ually established in the case of wilful torts, it has been until now stead-
fastly refused where the tort was merely negligent.'9 It was for the
Supreme Court of North Carolina to take the next step in the evolu-
tion of this doctrine, and hold for the first time that it applies equally
to negligent torts.20  If the right be admitted in the case of wilful
torts, it is -but logical and reasonable to make this extension. It is
interesting to note that this development is due entirely to a change
in judicial attitude since the statutes, rather than to any express legisla-
tive enactment.
Small v. Morrison, on the other hand, represents an intermediate
stage in a similar evolution of this right as between parent and child.
"See (1918) 27 YAIE LAw JOURNAL, xo8I; (1920) 30 ibid. i88; (1922) 32
ibid. 196; (x914) 28 HARV. L. REv. log; (1921) 34 ibid. 676; (923) 36 ibid. 346;
Noms (1917) I MINN. L. REv. 82; (1923) 21 MIcH. L. REv. 473.
'The husband may be criminally prosecuted for assault and battery on his
wife. State v. Lankford (1917, Del.) 6 Boyce, 594, lO2 Atl 63. Or for slander-
ing his wife. State v. Fulton (19o8) 149 N. C. 485, 63 S. E. 145. If death
results from the assault, the husband is guilty of murder. Clarke v. State
(1897) 117 Ala. I, 23 So. 671. There is a conflict as to whether he can be
guilty of larceny of his wife's property. Some courts hold that giving the wife
exclusive control over her property does not sever the unity of husband and
wife, and hence there can be no larceny. State v. Phillips (1912) 85 Ohio St.
317, 97 N. E. 976. Contra, that this unity is severed, and the husband is guilty
of larceny. Hunt v. State (19o4) 72 Ark. 241, 79 S. W. 769.
"'The Wife's remedies by a criminal prosecution, or an action for divorce and
alimony, which in some jurisdictions are allowed to stand as her adequate
remedies for wrongs of the sort described in this complaint, so far from being
adequate remedies, appear to us to be illusory and inadequate, while as for the
policy which would avoid the public airing of family troubles, we see no reason
why it should weigh more heavily against this action than those which courts
universally allow." Johnson v. Johnson, supra note 12, at p. 44, 77 So. at p. 338.
"Browt; v. Brown, supra note ii, at p. 46, 89 Atl. at p. 891.
'Other actions against the husband are allowed. Cook v. Cook (igoo) 125
Ala. 583, 27 So. 9,8 (ejectment); Shewalter v. Wood (1916, Mo. App.) 183
S. W. 1127 (replevin); Trayer v. Setzer (1904) 72 Neb. 845, 1oI N. W. 989
(contract) ; Eshom v. Eshom (1916) 18 Ariz. 170, 157 Pac. 974 (trover).
"' Woltman v. Woltman (1922, Minn.) 189 N. W. 1022; Heynan v. Heyman
(1917) i9 Ga. App. 634, 92 S. E. 25; Newton v. Weber, supra note 9.
"Roberts v. Roberts, supra note i.
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At common law a parent has an undoubted privilege of inflicting moder-
ate chastisement on his child."' It is not until this privilege is abused,
or an injury other than through chastisement is inflicted, that the parent
commits a tort upon the child. In such a case, the parent is every-
where open to criminal prosecution.2 2  But here too, in the few cases
that have arisen on the point, the right to sue the parent civilly was
denied the child.23  Such an action was condemned as against public
policy.2' Occasionally, a decision allowing such an action against one
in loco parentis gave an intimation that there were limits to this sup-
posed public policy.25  And now through the dissenting opinion of
Chief Justice Clark, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has given
the first legal expression of a conviction that a suit by a child against
its parent for a personal tort should be allowed. It is interesting, too,
that this first indication should come in the case of a negligent tort.
May not this prove, as were the dissenting opinions in Thompson v.
Thompson in the case of the wife, the necessary preliminary step to a
n The parent cannot be criminally prosecuted where the chastisement is only
moderate. Smith v. Slocum (872) 62 Ill. 354; Turner v. State (i896) 35 Tex.
Cr. 369, 33 S. W. 972. The reasonableness of such punishment is by the weight
of authority a question for the jury. Hinkle v. State (18gi) 127 Ind. 490, 26
N. E. 777; State v. Washington (1900) 104 La. 443, 29 So. 55. A few courts
hold that where there is no malice or serious injury, the judgment of the parent
is final. State v. Jones (r886) 95 N. C. 588.
' Hornbeck v. State (1896) 16 Ind. App. 484, 45 N. E. 620; State v. Koonse
(1907) 123 Mo. App. 655, 'o' S. W. 139. Some courts hold that excessive
punishment is sufficient to convict. Hinkle v. State, supra note 2. Others
require something besides mere excessive punishment,-usually legal malice or
permanent injury. Dean v. State (389o) 89 Ala. 46, 8 So. 38. If death occurs
from such excessive punishment, the parent is guilty of murder. Powell v.
State (1889) 67 Miss. iig, 6 So. 646. Or manslaughter. Montgomery v. Com-
inonwealth (19o1) 23 Ky. L. 732, 63 S. W. 747.
' Only five cases have been found, involving such an action by child against
parent. Hewlett v. George (i8gi) 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885; McKelvey i.
MeKelvey (19o3) iii Tenn. 388, 77 S. W. 664;. Roller v. Roller (19o5) 37 Wash.
242, 79 Pac. 788; Taubert v. Taubert (i9o8) 1o3 Minn. 247, 114 N. W. 763;
Feoley v. Foley (2895) 61 Ill. App. 577. Taubert v. Taubert, supra, combines a
dictum that if the child were emancipated, such action would lie.
"The conventional quotation to uphold this is the following: "The peace of
society, and the families composing society, and a sound public policy designed
to subserve the repose of families and the best interests of society forbid the
minor child a right to appear in court in assertion of a claim to civil redress for
personal injuries suffered at the hand of the parent. The state through its
criminal laws will give the minor child protection from parental violence and
wrong doing, and this is all the child can be heard to demand." Hewlett v.
George, supra note 23 at p. 711, 9 So. at p. 887.
'Nelson v. Johansen (1885) iA Neb. iSo, 24 N. W. 730 (liability for failure to
provide sufficient clothing) ; Treschman v. Treschman (1901) 28 Ind. App. 206,
61 N. E. 961 (step-child allowed damages for malicious assault); Clasen v.
Pruhs (903) 69 Neb. 278, 95 N. W. 640 (defendant charged with care of infant
liable for cruel treatment).
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future decision to that effect? It is true that in the case of the wife,
legislative action was a necessary step in perfecting her right. But
there judicial action was hampered by notions of the common law
unity of husband and wife, and its resulting disabilities. There has
never been any identity of child and parent. The child's individual
rights have always been recognized. The very helplessness of the child
to seek legislative aid should indicate that judicial action is the proper
remedy. The protection afforded the child, through the criminal courts,
the juvenile courts, and welfare officers, does not give the child any
reparation for past injuries, however severe and far-reaching they may
be.26 The law through its indirect sanctions recognizes the right, by
providing for a punishment of the parent. There seems to be no reason
why it should not directly sanction that right and give redress for the
personal tort as it does in the case of a tort to the child's property.
27
Right and remedy are reciprocal; and to deny the remedy is to deny
the right. The argument that this might undermine the foundations
of the home and parental authority is also unsound, for the remedy
would ordinarily be taken advantage of by the child only where the
parent has so exceeded his authority that the state would intervene in
any event. The natural love and respect which a child bears its parent
would preclude any great danger of abuse. And a civil right against
the father certainly would create no more discord than the present
remedies.28
Undoubtedly actions by a child against its parent should not be
encouraged; but where they are the only adequate remedy open to the
child, no court of justice should shut its doors. Especially is this true
where the right, as in the North Carolina case, is but a condition pre-
cedent to a further undisputed right to recover on the policy,-which
does not involve any element of family discord. That history will
"'We quite agree with appellant's counsel that courts should hesitate to invade
the privacy of the home, or to question the mutual confidence which should
obtain in the household. But this privacy and mutual confidence should not be
permitted to shield the evil-doer from the consequences flowing from a palpable
wrong. They are not sufficient to shield the parent from a criminal prosecutifo
for assault and battery on his child .... Nor can it be said that such
criminal prosecutions are ample to correct and punish all such abuses. They
may afford protection from parental violence and wrong doing thereafter, but
the fine which the state has imposed leaves the clear and palpable injustice
to the individual child still unredressed. It is not to be anticipated that acts
so abhorrent to the family relation will be committed, but when they have been
committed, and committed malo animo as here charged, and an injury inflicted
which can never be compensated for thereafter through the family relation,
howsoever exemplary it may be, courts should not hesitate to redress the wrong
in so far as it may be redressed through an action for damages." Treschman v.
Treschman, supra note 25, at p. 2io, 61 S. E. at p. 963.
"See Walker v. Crowder (i843) 37 N. C. 478; Bowe v. Bowe (1879) 42
Mich. 195.
'See (1923) 23 CoL. L. REv. 686.
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repeat itself and in time directly sanction this civil right of a child
against its parent for a personal tort is to be hoped for and expected.
Indeed, such a direct sanction has already been granted by at least one
court in an action by an illegitimate child against its parent for support.29
STATE SALES TAXATION AND THE ORIGINAL PACKAGE DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court of the United States has, at last, declared valid
state sales taxes,1 applied to goods in warehouses, sold in the original
packages in which they were transported from another state. State
property taxation of such articles as part of the general property within
the state has long been upheld.2  Comparatively recent decisions have
intimated that taxes on the sale of such articles were unconstitutional,
but apparently all the elements necessary to a square decision on the
point were not before the court.3 The inconsistency of this distinction
has often been pointed out' and now in Sonneborn Brothers v. Cureton
(1923) 262 U. S. 506, 43 Sup. Ct. 643, a Texas occupation tax on all
dealers in certain oils has been held valid as to taxes based on sales of
oil shipped into the state and afterward sold from the storeroom in the
original packages.5 The decision, of course, does not apply to goods
imported from foreign countries, to discriminatory taxation, to sales
occurring prior to the arrival of the goods within the state, or to sales
of goods to be shipped from the state.
It was in the early case of Brown v. Maryland6 that the original
package doctrine was enunciated. On the reasoning that importation
of foreign goods is not complete until the sale of the imports, the court
held that any tax on an article in the form and package in which
' For discussion of this problem as applied to an illegitimate child, see Doughty
v. Engler (1923, Kan.) 211 Pac. 61g; COMMENTS (1923) 32 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 825.
"Sales" taxation is used to include all taxation on the privilege of selling mer-
ch ndise, but particularly direct taxes on sales, occupation taxes on the amount of
sales and excessive inspection fees on sales.
'Brown v. Houston (885) 114 U. S. 622, 5 Sup. Ct lo9i; American Steel &
Wire Co. v. Speed (i9o4) 192 U. S. 500, 24 Sup. Ct. 365; see Bacon v. Illinois
(1913) 227 U. S. 504, 33 Sup. Ct 299; Judson, The Law of Interstate Commerce
(2d ed. 1912) see. i7; Landis, Restriction on Taxation (I921) 20 M ECH. L. REv.
50, 52.
'Standard Oil Co. v. Graves (1919) 249 U. S. 389, 39 Sup. Ct 320; Askren v.
Continental Oil Co. (1920) 252 U. S. 444, 40 Sup. Ct 355; Bowman v. Continental
Oil Co. (1921) 256 U. S. 642, 41 Sup. Ct. 6o6; ef. Texas Co. v. Brown (1922)
258 U. S. 466, 476, 42 Sup. Ct. 375, 378.
'Landis, op. cit. supra note 2, at p. 55; Powell, The Federal Constitution in
1920-1921 (1921) 20 MIcrH. L. REV. 135, 148; Powell, Constitutional Issues in
192I-1922 (1922) 21 MIcH. L. REv. 174, 197.
I See (1923) 37 HARV. L. R:Ev. 157. For discussion of the starting and ending of
interstate journeys, see Beale, The Situs of Things (igig) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
525; (1923) 32 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 849.
' (1827) 12 Wheat 419, and particularly 441, 446, 447.
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imported and in the custody and ownership of the importer is a duty on
imports and an invalid interference with interstate commerce. The
court suggested also that the doctrine would apply to goods transported
between the states as well as to imports from foreign countries.
Obviously this ignores an important distinction between the two
types of "imports." With respect to goods imported from foieign
countries, an immunity from taxation attaches to the import itself
even before sale, while a tax on goods brought in from another
state is invalid only if it is an unreasonable regulation or burden on
interstate commerce.7  Later cases have recognized this distinction and
have declared valid state sales taxes" and general property taxes9 on
merchandise in unbroken packages at rest in the state after an interstate
journey. And the more recent cases' ° distinguishing between state
sales and general property taxes seem to be based on cases where it was
assumed that certain excessive inspection fees upon articles coming in
from other states were an invalid interference with interstate
commerce.'1
The indiscriminate use of the word "import" to refer to the subjects
of interstate commerce as well as to goods coming from a foreign
country has been largely responsible for the misuse of the original
package doctrine.' 2 The doctrine has evoked criticism wherever
applied.' 3 It certainly has no justifiable application to the taxation of
goods coming from other states. The question to be determined in
each case of this character is whether there has been an undue inter-
ference with interstate commerce, and in doing so it is unsound to
invoke any arbitrary test. There is no such inherent difference between
uniformly applied sales and property taxation as to warrant the con-
clusion that state taxation on the sale of goods in original packages is
necessarily unconstitutional, where state property taxation of the same
merchandise is admittedly valid.
The clauses of ihe Federal Constitution involved are Art. i, sec. 8, cl. 3, dealing
with the rtegulation of interstate commerce; and Art. i, sec. 1o, cl. 2, prohibiting
states to levy imposts on imports.
'Woodruff v. Parham (1868) 8 Wall. 123, 136.
9 Supra note 2.1 0Supra note 3.
Standard Oil Co. v. Graves, supra note 3, in which the distinction seems to
have been first definitely indicated, has for its chief authority Foote v. Maryland
(1913) 232 U. S. 494, 34 Sup. Ct 377.
'See Leisy v. Hardin (189o) 135 U. S. 100, 110, 1o Sup. Ct. 681, 684; Standard
Oil Co. v. Graves, supra note 3, at p. 394, 39 Sup. Ct 321 ; Askren v. Continental
Oil Co., supra note 3, at p. 449, 40 Sup. Ct. at p. 356.
'Foster, What is Left of the Original Package Doctrine (1916) I So. L. QUART.
303; Trickett, The Original Package Ineptitude (19o6) 6 COL. L. REv. 161; Cooke,
Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution (i9o8) 27.
